The National Cancer Institute has placed women in the age group of 55-64 at the highest risk of contracting breast cancer. The percentage of new breast cancer cases by age for the years 2008-2012 was 25.6%.

Corporate America has a new shield: forced arbitration. Most every time you buy a cell phone, subscribe to a cable television service, or place a loved one in a nursing home, corporate America is requiring you to give up your rights.

On October 15th Volkswagen announced it would recall 8.5 million cars across the European Union.

Of interest to class action lawyers is the case of Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez currently pending before the United States Supreme Court.

Workplace injuries are inevitable and while preventable, occur frequently, especially in industries where the workforce performs manual labor. Industries or jobs requiring employees to operate heavy machinery or equipment pose a greater risk to employee safety.

It appears that decision makers in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) may be on the verge of requiring expedited recalls for car makers and suppliers impacted by the rupture prone Takata air bag.

The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) today published revised breast cancer screening criteria of the American Cancer Society.

Courts don’t want to put impediments in the way of witness testimony. But Indiana’s courts also do not want to interfere with the at-will employment doctrine. This case is about the places where these priorities conflict.

We represent different clients for lots of reasons, and we would like to be paid for those efforts in most cases. Sometimes, that payment can come from the opposing party. But be warned—you have an independent right to seek those fees from the opposing party.

Of interest to class action lawyers is the case of Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez currently pending before the United States Supreme Court.

If a judge thinks a juror is just giving excuses to get off of a jury, is that a reason not to strike the juror for cause? At least in this case, it was not.

When Melvin Hall left his employment at the Central Indiana Protection Agency, Inc. (“CIPA”) and started a competing company, the owners of CIPA (Shaw and Narducci) were not happy and allegedly engaged in a coordinated campaign to defame Hall and drive him out of business. Hall subsequently sued Shaw, Narducci and CIPA for defamation, abuse of process, malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Sometimes business owners reach for creative solutions in order to keep their businesses afloat. And those solutions can include an attempt to avoid debts. But Indiana’s courts have built a body of law to deal with these situations, and having a new business take over for the old will not work if it qualifies as a de facto merger.

A plaintiff can avoid Indiana’s Tort Claims Act if he can prove that a governmental employee’s act or omission was “clearly outside the scope of the employee’s employment.” But what is clear to one person may be muddy to the next. In this case, the Court helped teach us what this exception means.

Indemnification agreements can be a great way to get a deal done. But parties who enter into those agreements need to pay attention to exactly what is being indemnified.

Four years ago, the Indiana Supreme Court changed the way that Indiana’s courts addressed the issue of foreseeability when determining whether a landowner owed a duty to an invitee. Indiana’s appellate courts have grappled with this new standard ever since. But it appears that the Supreme Court did not like the path that the Court of Appeals was on and felt the need to issue a correction.

Venue issues are a common theme at these presentations. But this one has an interesting twist—a statute that says where the claim can proceed. But what happens if this is a third-party claim and the case is venued elsewhere?

This case teaches that the contemporaneous document doctrine may have implications that extend far beyond providing guidance for contract interpretation.

This case points out an issue for courts, more than litigants. But it is important for us to know it, so that we can make sure that courts address issues properly.

Defendants routinely argue that plaintiffs need expert testimony to show that a particular form of damage was caused by a particular tortious act. This case shows that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and plaintiffs can make that same argument, too.